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Donald J. Bieniewicz and Robert H. Nelson*

Planning a Market for Federal Coal
Leasing
The federal government owns 60 percent of the coal in the United States
west of the Mississippi River. Furthermore, federal and nonfederal coal
are often so intermingled in railroad checkerboard and many other areas
that they must be developed jointly. As a result, the federal government
also controls indirectly another 20 percent of western coal development.
Although western coal represented only a small part of total U.S. coal
production until recently, its share climbed rapidly in the 1970s, reaching
30 percent of U.S. production in 1981. Federal coal production-almost
all in the West-has grown correspondingly: in Fiscal 1982, it equaled
104 million tons, 13 percent of U.S. production. 1
Prior to the 1970s, little attention was paid to western coal. But as it
became apparent that western coal would soon be supplying a major share
of U.S. coal ouput, a fierce battle erupted for control over its development.
Several major lawsuits--one of which reached the Supreme Court-were
filed by environmental organizations opposing federal coal development
or seeking major changes in its management. Indeed, the stalemate in
federal coal policy proved so difficult to resolve that most federal leasing
was effectively suspended from May 1971 to January 1981. While many
policy issues were debated during this period, the greatest controversy
concerned the appropriate role 2of market forces in shaping the development of federal coal resources.
A Market Solution
In the private coal market, the pressures of competition tend to promote
development of lower cost deposits ahead of higher cost deposits.I Despite
*The authors are members of the Economics Staff, Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Department
of the Interior. The Interior Department does not necessarily agree with the analysis or conclusions
of this paper.
1. For basic federal coal information, see U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (Apr. 1979), and the
subsequent annual FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT REPORTS. See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AN ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION POTENTIAL OF FEDERAL COAL LEASES (Dec. 1981).
2. For an analysis of the federal coal program during the 1970s, see R. H., NELSON, THE
MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL POLICY (Duke University Press, forthcoming 1983).
3. The coal market is generally considered to be highly competitive. See OFFICE OF COMPETITION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, COAL COMPETITION PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980'S
(1981); and ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE COAL
INDUSTRY (Nov. 1980).
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considerable popular belief to the contrary, market forces in the form of
speculation also act to promote conservation of resources for the future.
Speculation might aptly be characterized as "private conservation;" it
provides a mechanism whereby future generations can pay current resource owners to conserve the resource.' Market processes also tend to
put each coal deposit in the hands of the particular producer who values
it most highly and can use it most efficiently. Competition among users
of coal would similarly ensure that the output of a particular deposit is
most likely to be purchased by the utility (or other user) which values it
most highly. Total national resources employed in coal production are
then determined by the competitiveness of coal in the market compared
with other energy resources (or conservation alternatives).
Until 1971, the federal government leased coal with few controls to
any private party requesting the coal. Partly for lack of federal attention,
the location and pace of development of federal coal was left to private
initiative and the pressures of the marketplace. However, this de facto
system-it was never explicitly adopted-could not survive the environmental challenges of the 1970s. Moreover, it was incompatible in many
ways with the statutory authority under which federal leasing took place.
Critics of federal leasing rightly claimed that the market did not take
account of many external impacts of coal development. In legislative and
administrative actions in the 1970s, the federal government tried to respond by adopting various regulatory measures to protect the environment.' The most important was the enactment in 1977 of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamatiori Act. 6 In another important step, the
Interior Department in 1979 established twenty "unsuitability criteria"
which specified circumstances in which federal leasing would not be
7
permitted for environmental reasons.
However, these actions by no means satisfied all the objections to a
market solution. Large scale coal development is highly disruptive to the
social environment and generally threatens people in the area with a loss
of control over their lives. Such forces create strong demands for greater
insulation from change, primarily by means of government control and
planning of coal development.' While such control could in theory be
4. For further discussion of the role of speculation, see R. L. GORDON, FEDERAL COAL
LEASING POLICY: COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY INDUSTRIES 8-12 (American Enterprise
Institute 1981).
5. For an in depth review of recent public lands policy, see R. H. Nelson, The Public Lands, in
CURRENT ISSUES IN NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY (P. R. Portney ed. 1982).
6. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. II
1978).
7. The unsuitability criteria are currently embodied in the regulations which govern the federal
coal management program at 43 C.F.R. § 3461.1 (1982).
8. See COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, LEASED AND LOST: A STUDY OF PUBLIC
AND INDIAN COAL LEASING IN THE WEST 20 (1974).
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exercised by regulatory mechanisms, many barriers exist to effective
public control over use of privately owned property. Some Westerners
perceive-probably correctly-that their ability to influence the federal
government is greater than their ability to control market forces. Through
such influence the real costs of redirecting coal development can be shifted
onto national taxpayers, who may barely notice these costs. In contrast,
were those costs to be borne at the state level, they would be more painful.
Full reliance on the market also requires that natural resource holders
be able to capture the value gains derived from conservation of the resource, i.e., that they be allowed to speculate. Some market critics oppose
speculation in principle as morally offensive. Others, however, contendif only implicitly in most cases-that the returns from speculation are
unduly high. Due to high private risk aversion or other reasons, society
concedes too much of the value of the resource as payment for the resource
conservation service performed by the private speculator. In effect, this
view argues that it is less expensive for society to perform the speculative
function itself through government.
The specific means by which the government sought to eliminate private
speculative incentives to hold federal coal was the diligent development
requirement under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. 9 However, the Act's
general requirement for diligent development of leases was never effectively enforced. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976
eliminated any uncertainty as to the development requirement by expressly
requiring that future coal leases be brought into production within ten
years of lease issuance.' 0 In the presence of this diligent development
requirement, leasing of more coal than the market can absorb will result
in various distortions of normal market workings. In the extreme, a
company might even open a mine and stockpile the coal, simply to avoid
losing the lease for lack of development. As a result, the government
faces strong pressures to lease only that amount of coal which can be
produced in the near term.
Central Planningfor Federal Coal
Although the Nixon and Ford Administrations sought to employ market
approaches, congressional and judicial pressures were moving towards a
much more direct government role. In 1977 the Carter Administration
initiated a system of central planning for federal coal development. This
effort occurred in conjunction with a wider trend towards central planning
throughout the U.S. energy sector, reflected in the creation of a new
Department of Energy (DOE).
9. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976).
10. Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 30 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1976).
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The new coal program developed by the Carter Administration began
with DOE calculation of individual production goals for each of twelve
coal regions of the United States. In six of these regions, federal coal
was a major part of the total coal resource. The production goals were
to be set for five and ten years in the future and to include both nonfederal and federal coal. Following receipt of the DOE goals, the Interior
Department would next estimate the total production (non-federal and
federal) already planned or otherwise likely to occur in each region five
and ten years in the future. This production was assumed to require no
further federal coal leasing. If the already planned level of production
fell short of the production goal, new federal leasing would be indicated.
The specific level of leasing would then depend on Interior estimates of
the appropriate non-federal and federal shares in meeting any projected
production shortfalls. Finally, the Interior Department would have to
select the best federal tracts to lease.
The Carter Administration recognized that some uncertainties would
arise in making such estimates. In hindsight, however, it seems fair to
say that the uncertainties were substantially underestimated by Interior
officials-at least initially." As part of the plan for federal coal leasing,
separate sets of regional coal production goals were prepared by the DOE
in 1978, 1979, and 1980. This effort yielded rapidly shifting production
goals, providing dramatic evidence of the difficulties in central coal planning. In an admittedly extreme example, the 1990 DOE production goal
for the San Juan River coal region in New Mexico equalled 58 million
tons when calculated in 1978, dropped all the way to 17 million tons in
1979, and then rose back to 57 million tons in 1980 (all based on the
assumptions considered most likely). The 1990 DOE goal set for the key
Powder River coal region was calculated at 396 million tons in 1978,
rose slightly to 418 million tons in 1979, and then fell sharply to 294
million tons in 1980.12
The information required to calculate accurate production goals for
individual coal regions is extensive. For example, coal production for
the Powder River coal region depends in part on demands from states to
11. Other federal agencies, in particular, the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS),
Department of Justice (DOJ), and DOE, did express concern over the way Interior was calculating
leasing targets, and proposed that such targets be set two to three times higher than the Interior
Department numbers. See letter to Frank Gregg, Director, BLM, from Donald L. Flexner, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, DOJ, 1979. See also Internal COWPS Memorandum
to Tom Hopkins and Ron Lewis from Jack Campbell, Federal Coal Leasing: Problems and Solutions
(Jan. 9, 1980).
12. LEASING POLICY DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL
COAL LEASING AND 1985 AND 1990 REGIONAL COAL PRODUCTION FORECASTS (June
1978); WORKING PAPER: INTERIOR UPDATES TO 1985 AND 1990 REGIONAL FORECASTS
(Apr. 1979); and THE 1980 BIENNIAL UPDATE OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL COAL PRODUCTION GOALS FOR 1985, 1990 AND 1995 (Dec. 1980).
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the east, such as Wisconsin. The government would need to know how
much Powder River coal would be purchased by Wisconsin utilities at
various prices. This knowledge in turn would require information on the
cost of alternative coal supplies, such as Kentucky or Illinois coal, or
alternative energy sources such as nuclear or gas power generation for
Wisconsin. The potential for conservation of electric power use as power
prices rise would be a further important factor. Different transportation
and environmental protection costs would affect the desirability in Wisconsin of each alternative. Moreover, coal prices would not hold steady,
but would change as the amounts of coal supplied from each region varied,
or as the cost of factor inputs into coal production varied. Such information
would be required for hundreds if not thousands of other places and
circumstances. Any major changes in one part of the system would require
a recalculation to take account of effects throughout the rest of the system
as well. While such a system can be simulated with the use of modern
computers, the results tend to be unreliable, especially at a high level of
disaggregation.
By the end of Carter's tenure, even the original proponents of central
planning in the Administration harbored serious doubts. Due in part to
the seeming uncertainty in the central planning process, actual selection
of leasing levels tended to be informed more by considerations of administrative capacity to lease than by central planning calculations.
In seeking more realistic approaches to development of federal coal
resources, the Carter coal program shifted towards greater use of market
mechanisms. The Reagan Administration has accelerated this trend. The
movement is not towards a free market as such, but toward what might
better be called a "planned" market.
Because market outcomes do not always correspond to social goals,
economists have sought to find ways of redirecting the market without
undermining its basic productive efficiency. While the verdict could change
in the future, the political process thus far has clearly dictated that private
gains from speculation in federal coal should be minimized. The government is thus constrained by a requirement that it should lease only
that amount of federal coal which can be developed promptly, given
construction lead times and other mechanics for commencing mine production. Some additional coal leasing may be necessary simply to facilitate the assembly of minable properties sufficient for advance commitment
of coal reserves to meet utility plans.
The diligent development requirement thus creates an equity versus
efficiency tradeoff. An attempt to eliminate even short-term speculative
holdings of federal coal would eliminate necessary flexibility in the system
and would generate large national efficiency losses. Hence, a pragmatic
aim is to prevent only long-term speculation-however defined. Lessees
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can hold on to federal coal for shorter periods, even while non-producing.
The length of the permissible holding period will depend on social preferences in trading off distributional impacts versus efficiency of national
coal use.
The disillusionment created by actual central planning experiences is
now forcing this tradeoff to the fore again. Assuming some social resolution, a planned-market philosophy would seek to implement the tradeoff
with a minimum of interference with the underlying market mechanism.
Keeping this goal in mind, economists in the Interior Department's Office
of Policy Analysis have formulated two basic market plans for federal
coal leasing.
Market Plan I-ntertract Competition
A new design for federal coal leasing was first proposed in 1975 by
C. B. McGuire, a Berkeley professor who at the time was on leave to
the Office of Policy Analysis. Under this plan, the government would
first determine how much coal should be leased, preventing large scale
speculative holdings. However, government would not determine which
specific tracts to lease. Instead, within a sale region all or most tracts
which were deemed suitable for coal development would be put up for
bid. Only the specific tracts receiving the highest bids on a per ton basis
would be leased, up to the specified target leasing level. McGuire called
this leasing approach "intertract competition.," 3 Separate intertract sales
would be held for metallurgical coal and possibly for synthetics coal or
other sufficiently differentiated coal types.
McGuire was most concerned with the likely failure of traditional sale
methods "to yield a revenue near to true value of the land under optimal
exploitation."' 4 He noted that bidding competition for individual tracts
was apt to be very weak, because there are a great number of potential
coal mining tracts, each of which tends to be of interest to a single firm;
however, bidding competition could be significantly enhanced by putting
firms in a position where they would have to compete with bidders for
other tracts as well, in other words, by creating intertract competition.
Interior analysts soon recognized that intertract competition might be
even more useful as a tract selection mechanism. 5 Typically far more
13. C. B. McGuire, Intertract Competition for Western Coal Development, Office of Policy
Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Interior (Dec. 10, 1975). See also C. B. McGuire, Intertract Competition
and the Design of Lease Sales for Western Coal Lands (prepared for the session on Federal Mineral
Leasing Policy, 53rd Annual Western Economic Association Conference, June 25, 1978).
14. C. B. McGuire (1975), supra note 13, at 1.
15. See OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BIDDING SYSTEMS
FOR COAL LEASING (Feb. 2, 1976); and T. Teisberg and R. H. Nelson, Coal Tract Selection and
Bidding System Option Paper, Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Interior (May 5, 1978). For
some critical comments, see W. E. TYNER AND R. J. KALTER, WESTERN COAL: PROMISE
OR PROBLEM (1978).

July 1983]

FEDERAL COAL LEASING

coal tracts are available for lease than the government desires to see
leased. Without use of a market mechanism, the government would have
to examine all the potentially leasable tracts and then decide which ones
have the highest overall value. The government would be required to
make extensive calculations of selling prices for different quality coal
and of the costs of mining and transporting coal at the various potential
sites. Under intertract competition, however, coal companies would make
such calculations, to be reflected in the prices they bid for each lease. A
market mechanism in the form of bidding competition among tracts thus
selects the most valuable specific deposits to lease, i.e., those that receive
the highest bids.
The market created through intertract competition would be similarin
some respects to the private market for coal supply contracts. In that
private market, the contracts signed by utilities in any particular year are
limited in number and coal suppliers compete for them. Some utilities
ask potential suppliers to submit bids on the price per ton the firm would
accept to deliver coal of a specified quality. The supplier making the
lowest bid wins the contract. Similarly, in intertract competition the firms
pursuing the best federal coal tracts could afford to bid the highest prices
per ton and thus win their respective coal leases. Both procedures tend
to select appropriate coal sites and to obtain appropriate coal prices; both
represent use of a selection mechanism that is natural to market processes.
What amounts to a form of intertract competition (although not called
by that name) is currently successfully employed to sell Treasury bills.
In Treasury Department auctions, bills are sold to the bidders making the
lowest yield offers, up to the total number of bills to be sold as set by
the Treasury. The principal difference between Treasury sales and intertract sales is that the bills being sold are identical whereas federal coal
tracts are not. Some people have in fact suggested taking intertract bids
on a fully standardized tonnage basis, with all tracts adjusted for coal
quality differences and mining costs. However, this procedure would
negate many of the tract-selection benefits of intertract competition. Intertract competition is designed to select low-cost tracts in much the same
way that a government-established system of marketable pollution permits
would select the firms able to reduce emissions at least cost.
Intertract competition has yet to be tested in practice, although Interior
Secretary Watt had decided to do so in the April 1982 coal lease sale in
the Powder River Basin. Intertract competition was to be used to lease
two tracts from among four available tracts located near Ashland, Montana. The regional coal team had ranked the four tracts as having very
similar environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Unfortunately, the test
could not be undertaken when three of the tracts ultimately did not qualify
for the sale because of surface owner consent problems. However, a
precedent had been set in that intertract competition had been preferred

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

to administrative tract selection in a portion of a scheduled federal coal
lease sale.
Intertract competition has several drawbacks. There is some loss of
social control over non-economic factors related to coal development.
One can argue, however, that the major externalities- associated with coal
development have been internalized by surface mining laws and other
environmental protection measures. Remaining environmental costs could
also be accounted for by subtracting estimates of these costs from company bids for each tract and then selecting for lease those tracts with the
highest net bids (i.e., the amount bid minus the environmental cost estimate). Some commentators have also been concerned that, under intertract competition, companies face greater uncertainty about the prospects
of winning a tract; in general, their bidding calculations become much
more complex. This problem can be reduced significantly by using oral
bidding for sales using intertract competition-as the Interior Department
planned to do in the Montana sale.
In intertract sales, the government must still decide on the appropriate
amount of coal to lease. This task is itself amenable to a market approach
which we call the "inventory" method. The government would first lease
a large enough inventory of federal coal reserves to provide wide competition for upcoming coal supply contracts. The goal might be to lease
enough coal to meet coal needs for new coal supply contracts expected
to be signed over the next seven to ten years. The trigger for new leasing,
once an acceptable inventory level had been reached, would be a drawdown of the inventory as new coal supply contracts were signed. This
approach would rely on direct observation of the absorption of federal
coal leases in the market to signal the need for new leasing.
De facto, the government has already been making its leasing decisions
in much this way. Past leasing controversies have often concerned the
size of the appropriate inventory. A formal and explicit recognition of
this approach should spur more analysis and better understanding of
inventory requirements-drawing upon a large inventory literature.
The initial build-up of the inventory should also be carefully calculated.
Holding several small intertract sales, perhaps spaced several months
apart, would probably be better than attempting to establish the full
inventory in a single sale. Each small sale would provide useful feedback
about the demand for additional reserves and the need for further sales.
This strategy would also reduce the range of value among the tracts leased
in each sale and thus tend to provide more competitive, higher bids
overall.
One problem is that the current ten year diligent development requirement does not give much leeway for an inventory strategy to function.
In the case of large, new western surface mines, it can take as long as
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seven years to get into production after the firm obtains a coal supply
contract. 16 Thus, the effective time period within which a new lease will
have to obtain a coal supply contract could be as short as three years.
The government could be required to restock its inventory completely
every three years with new coal leases. Among other concerns, the likelihood of ending up with either too large or too small an inventory is
greatly increased in operating under such a tight leash. For the inventory
approach to achieve its full potential, Congress would have to allow more
time for coal leases to reach development. 17
While intertract competition will make the final tract selection from
the eligible set, the government must still determine the tracts in this
latter category. Each potential tract must be evaluated to determine its
environmental acceptability for leasing, which can be a costly exercise.
However, a market mechanism can be employed in this undertaking as
well. Companies would be requested to nominate tracts for inclusion in
a lease sale, but would be required to pay a fee for each nomination. If
the tract were actually leased, the winning bidder would be required to
reimburse the initial nominator for his fee. Charging a nominations fee
equal to the administrative cost of evaluating each nomination would
recover the costs to the government, as well as induce firms to focus
nominations on tracts that actually have a good chance of being leased. 8
Postponing environmental and other tract evaluation until after the
intertract auction (but still prior to final lease issuance) would be another
way to reduce tract evaluation costs. After the auction only those tracts
receiving high bids would then be evaluated. If this evaluation revealed
unacceptable environmental or other consequences, the tract would not
be leased and another tract (which had received a lower bid) would instead
be leased. Bids thus would be accepted contingent on acceptable results
of later environmental studies.
Market Plan II-A Uniform Minimum Price System
Under intertract competition, government sets the quantity of coal to
be leased and a market mechanism then determines the minimum price
required to obtain a coal lease. The alternative would be to set a minimum
price and then let this price determine the amount of coal leased in the
market. Operationally, government would simply make all or most en16. Policy Planning and Evaluation, Inc., Impact of Government Regulations on Coal Mine StartUp and Production (May 29, 1981) (prepared for the Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Dep't of
Interior).
17. See Nelson, Undue Diligence: The Mine-It-Or-Lose-It Rule for Federal Coal, REGULATION
34 (Jan./Feb. 1983).
18. For further discussion of a nominations fee approach, see D. J. Bieniewicz, Improvements
to the Federal Coal Leasing Program Linked to the Use of Intertract Bidding, Office of Policy
Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Interior 28-30 (draft April 24, 1981).
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vironmentally acceptable tracts available for lease. Any high bid for a
tract that was above the minimum price would be accepted. Separate
minimum prices would be set for metallurgical coal or any other special
uses for which coal types cannot be substituted.
If the intertract approach is similar to a system of marketable pollution
permits, then the price control approach is similar to a system of emission
fees. Either strategy is capable of controlling leasing/pollution levels. In
fact, in a world of perfect knowledge and zero transactions costs, the
results would be exactly the same under a quantity or a price control
strategy. Which approach is actually preferable must be determined based
on administrative feasibility and cost, information requirements, and political acceptability, as well as the cost of resultant leasing/pollution levels
that are too low or too high.
Recently, the pressure for more rapid mineral leasing has led to some
use of price control methods in federal leasing of oil and gas on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS). In recent years there had been about a half
dozen OCS lease sales annually with approximately 100 to 250 tracts
offered in typical sales. Around 1970, the minimum bid was set at $25
per acre, or $125,000 for a standard 5,000 acre OCS tract. In 1982, the
Interior Department initiated a new policy of "area wide" sales of much
greater size. Concurrently, the minimum bid was raised to $150 per acre,
or $750,000 for a typical tract. The Department explained that "the
program will make more acreage available for leasing, ' . . and will use
the market mechanism rather than government decisions to select areas
for lease and exploration."1 9
The Interior Department has also made a limited move towards a price
control method in federal coal leasing. In 1982, the Department raised
the minimum bid for federal coal leases from $25 an acre to $100 an
acre-an action unlikely, however, to create an effective screen for identification of high-value coal sites. Although $100 an acre is a high price
for thin-seamed eastern coal, it is quite low for much thicker-seamed
western coal.
The appropriate minimum price per ton could be set in several ways.
For example, the minimum could be based on observation of prices paid
in private sales of prime leases, or could be set via application of exhaustible resource theory to estimate the size of the present worth economic rents of coal near its optimal time of leasing. Alternatively, the
minimum price could be identified by the lowest bid accepted in an
intertract sale, where quantity control is used to set the appropriate leasing
level, or by holding a series of small sales, starting with a rather high
19. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ADOPTION OF PROPOSED
FINAL FIVE-YEAR OCS OIL AND GAS PROGRAM ANNOUNCED (May 13, 1982).
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minimum price per ton and reducing it in each further sale until a leasing
level deemed appropriate is reached. Once an inventory of leases is in
place, the minimum price could simply be adjusted for changes in the
inventory. If the inventory tends to exceed the level desired, the price
should be raised. Conversely, if the inventory is too low, the price should
be reduced.
A mixture of approaches may in fact be desirable. It is likely for
political, emotional reasons that tight controls over levels of leasing will
be preferred for initial establishment of a suitable inventory of federal
leases available for new production. However, once that inventory is built
up, a switch to a pricing strategy would offer some significant advantages.
Simply leasing to anyone willing to pay the minimum price would allow
reduced administrative effort and provide much faster response time to
company coal needs. Such leasing would be drawn from a base of tracts
already determined to be envrionmentally acceptable for development.
The old preference right leasing system, abandoned in the 1970s, was
similar to this proposed system-although limited to "unexplored" coal
regions. 20 This system's main shortcoming was that it used in effect a
zero price, and thus was incapable of controlling leasing levels during a
time of rapidly rising coal resource values.
One means of charging a part of the minimum price would be to include
a requirement for payment of an annual rental, equal to some percentage
of the lease bonus. Thus, for a valuable western lease which obtained a
bonus of say $4,000 per acre, a one percent ($40 an acre) annual rental
might be required-as compared with three dollars an acre at present.
Such a rental would create a disincentive to speculative lease holdings,
provide a steady revenue stream to the states in which federal coal is
located, and make it easier for small firms to compete with large firms
in bidding for federal coal.
Obstacles to Market Planning
While the federal government has not yet expressly adopted either of
the market plans described above, a number of limited steps have been
taken in these directions, some of which have been mentioned previously.
Perhaps most important, there has been broad recognition of the difficulties of central planning and the importance of moving towards a market
mechanism.
20. Under the preference right leasing system an applicant could file for a two year prospecting
permit in areas where the presence of coal was uncertain, To obtain a lease the holder of a prospecting
permit had to demonstrate that coal had in fact been found in "commercial quantities." This program
was suspended by the Interior Department in 1971 and abolished by the Congress in 1976. See
Fairfax & Andrews, Debate Within and Debate Without: NEPA and the Redefinition of the "Prudent
Man" Rule, 19 NAT. RES, J. 505 (July 1979).
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A major remaining obstacle to formal market planning is concern that
any explicit calculation of leasing limits will encourage monopoly restrictions on federal coal supplies.2" Western states, which receive much
of the revenues from leasing, might in fact benefit from a restricted federal
coal supply and the higher coal prices that would result. Since the market
plans described previously involve an explicit limit on leasing, their
adoption might end up providing a mechanism for inappropriate restriction
of coal supply. This would, of course, be a perversion of the plans' intent,
but such a gap between intent and result is by no means unheard of.
Policy makers inclined to free-market views have been the most concerned
in this regard.
On the other hand, neither have policy makers inclined towards central
planning supported planned-market approaches with great enthusiasm.
The central planning proponents like the explicit limit on leasing amountsthe sticking point for the free marketeers-but are discomfited instead by
the loss of social control in using a market mechanism to accomplish
tract selection. They feel much more comfortable with retention of tight
government control over the entire coal development process. While
easily caricatured and overstated, the natural bureaucratic impulse is also
towards retaining tight control, in part reflecting a distrust of market
unpredictability.
The coal industry has been strongly opposed to intertract competition
thus far. In public meetings prior to the Powder River lease sale, almost
every industry representative objected to the proposal for a limited experiment with intertract competition. Business seems primarily concerned
with the potential for stiffer competition. However, business attitudes
may change when some of the benefits to industry-especially the assurance of a neutral tract selection process-are more widely perceived.
The leading proponents of a planned market for federal coal have been
professional economists, mostly in government. Given normal government inertia and other obstacles to any new proposal, planned-market
approaches may have made as much headway as could be expected thus
far.

21. The government role should be that of "efficient speculator," not of monopolist. See Quirin
and Kalymon, The Problem of Timing in Resource Development, in MINERAL LEASING AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 143 (M. Crommelin & A. R. Thompson, eds. 1977) and
Teisberg, FederalManagement of Energy and Mineral Resources on the Public Lands, 11 BELL
JOURNAL 448 (Autumn 1980).

